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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This study relied on data gathered on school identifiers and characteristics, student 
and teacher characteristics, and index scores of Kentucky public elementary schools, 
collected from 2001-2008 at the school level. An extensive literature review was completed 
in order to examine the effects of competition on public schools, both positive and negative.  
This paper focused on the impact of public school competition on academic index 
scores in Kentucky school districts. Competition was measured in two ways: by the number 
of schools available per student in the district as well as the total district enrollment 
controlling for the total number of schools in a district. The data were analyzed using both 
a fixed-effects regression model and a between-effects regression model. The findings 
indicate that from year to year, increases in district enrollment have a positive effect on 
school index scores, but on average over the eight years, district enrollment actually has a 
negative impact. Overall, the findings suggest that public school competition does not 
appear to have a significant impact on school performance in Kentucky. Further analysis of 
competition among schools is recommended in order to provide policy makers with a 
better understanding of how competition, from both public and private institutions, can 
improve the quality of schooling in Kentucky. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 How best to go about increasing the quality of public schools is currently a 
controversial and highly debated issue in the United States.  Federal, state, and local school 
boards across the nation have been faced with declining schools; prompting voters to rally 
for change, often in the form of school choice. Similarly, the demand by parents for high 
quality schools has led education reformers to look for new ways to improve the primary 
and secondary public school system. Many researchers have argued that increased 
competition can improve the quality of schools. This market-based reform, in the shape of 
expanded parental choice, has been debated in the past twenty years with no definitive 
answer as to whether this view can be substantiated. Proponents of school competition 
argue that increased choice for parents forces schools to work harder to be effective and, 
therefore, competitive in the education “market”. Those opposed to school competition 
suggest that some parents may not be aware of their choice options, and that this lack of 
awareness will hurt the worst schools with the most disadvantaged students. Significant 
research has been done on school competition and choice in urban settings, but little 
research has looked at competition among public schools in rural settings. Most literature 
focuses on urban competition and choice options of private and charter schools often with 
the use of vouchers. This study sought to examine the public elementary schools in 
Kentucky, in geographic areas ranging from urban to rural including the Appalachian 
region. When treated as a private market good, school competition might be an aspect in 
determining school performance.  
This paper examined competition among public schools and its impact on school 
performance, as measured by academic index scores. The hypothesis was that school 
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competition would have a positive impact on school index scores, assuming  increased 
competition within districts requires public schools to work that much harder to keep high-
achieving students in their schools. In theory, school districts with fewer schools do not 
have as much competition and therefore do not have the incentive to work to keep 
students; their students have no alternative public school options and so school scores in 
districts with fewer schools would be lower. Similarly, in rural areas there are often fewer 
private school alternatives which provides even less incentive for the public schools to 
remain competitive. 
In the context of this paper, competition is measured in two ways. One measure 
examines the number of schools in a district, controlling for the total student enrollment of 
the district. The other is the ratio of the number of schools in a district to the number of 
students in the district.  Both methods are used to examine the effects of competition on 
academic index scores. 
  
TIEBOUT CHOICE 
Charles Tiebout discussed his model regarding public choice in a 1956 paper 
entitled A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. The Tiebout model states that the choice 
process allows individuals to determine an equilibrium of the provision of local public 
goods that are in harmony with the tastes and desires of the residents. In turn, the 
population sorts into their optimum and best matching communities (Tiebout, 1956). An 
analysis of Tiebout choice is important because it can provide quicker changes to American 
schools than certain reforms because it allows families to locate where they choose and lets 
them continue to move until they find a location that maximizes their utility i.e. voting with 
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their feet (Hoxby, 2002). The effects of education reform can take years to been seen, if 
they are seen at all; however Tiebout choice allows the equilibrium effects of choice to be 
seen in a much shorter time frame. In the absence of barriers to moving, housing and job 
markets can affect the degree of Tiebout choice. In a metropolitan area where many of the 
jobs and housing are located within one district, the cost of commuting to an adjacent 
district is high. Whereas, in an area where several school districts are clustered near many 
jobs, the cost of school choice is low. Tiebout choice is also important to understand when 
examining school competition because reform is often introduced to extend school choice 
options, not create them. Tiebout choice already accounts for some of the reasons families 
choose to live and send their children to school where they do. The effects of new school 
choice reforms may not be entirely attributed to those reforms.  
 This paper assumed that each student in the data set resided in the same county in 
which they attend school. In other words, a student only considers public schools in their 
county of residence. While this assumption does limit a student’s possible choice of schools, 
it was necessary because the exact location of the school was known but not the location of 
the residence of the student.  
 
  
OVERVIEW OF CHOICE IN KENTUCKY 
 Kentucky’s public educational system is comprised of 120 county-based school 
districts and 55 independent school districts. Kentucky’s geographic make up consists of 
many large rural areas with very few urban areas. This landscape makes school choice and 
competition unique and varied throughout the state. The restrictive somewhat language of 
Kentucky’s Constitution with respect to education funding and the more restrictive 
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interpretation of Kentucky’s state religion clauses make instituting a general voucher 
program difficult (Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice). Kentucky does not have a 
private school choice program in place and is one of only ten states that have not passed 
legislation regarding charter schools1. However, this may change as a result of the failure to 
receive money from the Race to the Top Fund; the federal program designed to spur 
reforms in state and local district K-12 education. Competitive grants to states were 
awarded to encourage education innovation and reform based on four areas. Kentucky 
received lower marks, due in part by the lack of charter schools in Kentucky. Kentucky 
school districts also are held to the requirements of Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) under 
No Child Left Behind.2 With a five-tier structure, consequences for the tiers increase each 
consecutive year that a school does not make AYP. After two years of not making AYP (Tier 
1), school choice must be provided as an option to children at the underperforming schools. 
A 2009 phone survey of 1,200 Kentucky residents conducted by The Friedman 
Foundation for Educational Choice found that fifty percent of K-12 parents would like to 
send their child to a private school, while in reality only nine percent of students attend 
private schools. Twelve percent of parents said they would send their children to charter 
schools if they were an option in Kentucky. Only thirteen percent of parents said they 
would choose traditional public schools, when in actuality ninety one percent of K-12 
students attend traditional public schools. Based on the results of the survey, it appears 
that Kentucky may be lacking a school choice system that is able to sufficiently match 
                                                 
1 Charter schools in the U.S. are schools that receive public money but are not subject to some of the rules, 
regulations, and statutes that apply to other public schools. Charter schools are opened and attended by 
choice, but are not allowed to charge tuition.  
2 AYP results are based on the Kentucky Core Content Tests in reading and mathematics. Schools are required 
to have specific percentages of students reaching proficiency or above in reading and mathematics each year 
and to meet other criteria in order to make AYP.  
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parents’ schooling preferences (Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice , School 
Choice Survey). 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is mixed opinion among education researchers regarding school competition and its 
impact on school performance. Overall, the scope of the research on school choice reveals a 
mixed picture, with some studies suggesting positive impacts, and others indicating 
negative impacts. Great differences exist among school choice literature; in the overall 
quality of the research as well as the conclusions the research supports.  
 
Proponents of School Competition  
As one of the earliest proponents of school choice, Milton Friedman argued that 
vouchers for primary and secondary education would widen the options to parents and 
provide positive outcomes for students. Friedman’s paper opines that, “Government, 
preferably local governmental units, would give each child, through his parents, a specified 
sum to be used solely in paying for his general education; the parents would be free to 
spend this sum at a school of their own choice, provided it met certain minimum standards 
laid down by the appropriate governmental unit. Such schools would be conducted under a 
variety of auspices: by private enterprises operated for profit, nonprofit institutions 
established by private endowment, religious bodies, and some even by governmental units” 
(Friedman, 1955). Since the proposal by Friedman in the 1950’s, vouchers have been 
discussed and widely debated.  
In her paper, Hoxby (2002) found that Tiebout choice increases productivity in 
schools and also improves achievement while lowering spending per student. Hoxby’s 
9 
 
research results have been seen as controversial, but she provided a starting point for 
innovative ways to measure school competition. Additional research about the impact of 
private schools on competition suggests the competition improves the quality of the public 
schools (Dee, 1998). Dee’s research concluded that competition, even from private schools, 
provides education benefits not just to those students who are able to choose their school; 
the increase in competition has positive effects on student outcomes at all competing 
schools. 
Several researchers argue that the higher the level of competition among school 
districts, the more pressure there is for the individual districts to perform in order to 
maintain their student base. Chubb and Mo hypothesize that public schools struggle more 
than private schools because they have less autonomy and are a product of the democratic 
institution (1988). Their work has helped develop a framework for school choice in public 
schools. Blair and Staley (1995) examined evidence from Borland and Howsen (1992) 
which proposed that standardized test scores would be higher in areas with more 
competition among schools and districts. Blair and Staley found that metropolitan areas 
with less public school competition have lower school quality. They also found that 
competition from neighboring schools has a positive effect on student performance.  
A review of school choice options in Chicago Public Schools found that students who 
chose to attend a public school other than the one they were zoned for, were more likely to 
graduate than those students who stayed at their zone school (Cullen, Jacob, Levitt, 2005). 
Cullen et al also found that students are more likely to graduate if they opt out of their zone 
school, but that they do so for reasons other than peers, resources, teachers or curricula. 
They hypothesize that students may leave their local schools to attend schools with higher 
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levels of outputs such as higher average test scores and graduation rates.  While Cullen et al 
do not have an exact explanation for the decision of students to opt out of their assigned 
school, their research does support the concept that competition increases productivity.   
Selection bias can be a concern when examining school choice both in public and 
private schools and is something that should be carefully examined. For example, it is 
possible that students who are seeking better educational institutes are doing so because 
they (or their parents) have higher education aspirations. This could make the receiving 
school appear better and the losing school appear worse even if they are both similarly 
“productive” in delivering student performance. Schneider, Teske, Marschall, Mintrom, and 
Roch (1997) acknowledge that parents who are actively choosing alternative schools may 
bias research results because they are not a random selection of parents in the district. 
Schneider et al, like many others, attempt to put in place controls in an effort to control for 
bias. It can only be assumed that these controls allow for an accurate portrayal of school 
choice.  
 
Opponents of School Competition  
In opposition to the arguments for the benefits of school competition, there is 
literature which poses the idea that competition has negative effects on productivity and 
performance. McMillan (2000) argues that the effect of school competition is close to zero 
and can sometimes have a negative impact on certain communities by lowering the quality 
of education offered. McMillan goes on to suggest that targeted vouchers, given to poor 
households to pay tuition and fees for their children's schooling at participating non-public 
schools, would be a better instrument to increase productivity. In a 2006 paper, Rothstein 
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looked for evidence of parental demand by examining the distribution of student outcomes 
across schools. After researching the incentive effects of competition among districts he 
found, contradictory to his initial hypothesis, that school choice did not have a significant 
impact on increased school effectiveness. He discussed the idea that “effectiveness sorting” 
only disappears if parents do not attach any value to effectiveness or peer groups. 
Rothstein holds that this is unlikely to happen because parents typically realize the 
importance of a child’s peer group. He does, however, caution against generalizing the 
paper’s results to choice markets that break up school assignment from residential 
location. He does so on the basis that school choice may be sensitive to other factors such 
as nonschool neighborhood amenities that were not considered in the paper. In another 
paper, titled Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers? A 
Comment on Hoxby, Rothstein replicated Hoxby’s research methods with a corrected data 
set she supplied. When Rothstein ran the data, he found that the model was highly sensitive 
to alterations. He also found that, conversely to Hoxby’s results, the effect of choice on 
achievement was not significant. While Hoxby’s decision to count the number of rivers and 
streams in a geographical area to determine a school district’s “market share” and 
boundaries was creative, according to Rothstein the data and methodology had several 
errors which, when corrected, yielded results that were not significant. In a recent paper, 
Loeb, Valant, and Kasman (2011) looked at current choice reforms and their effects on 
student achievement. Their paper discussed arguments as to why one might expect choice 
and competition to improve student achievement based on demand side forces, the school 
choosers such as parents, and supply side forces, the schools. They worked with the 
Milwaukee Public Schools in 2010 to survey principals about how they felt their school 
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competed for students. Their results found that when the school leaders felt any 
competition for students, they responded by trying to influence the information received 
by the parents rather than actually improving the school to better meet the student’s needs. 
Their conclusion suggested that given the interest surrounding school choice, much of the 
results have been underwhelming and show only modest benefits. They do however 
acknowledge that although some research has shown that school choice efforts do not 
always have the desired results, it is important to continue to study them because we still 
have much to learn about choice options.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data 
There are nearly 645,000 students enrolled in the Kentucky public school system in 
grades K-12. The school level data used in this paper were collected from the Kentucky 
Department of Education from the 2001-2008 school years. Missing data were filled in 
from the National Center for Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data (CCD).3 The dataset 
included information on school identifiers and characteristics, student characteristics, 
teacher characteristics, and index scores, all collected at the school level. Information on 
the geographic land area of the school districts was collected from the Census Bureau 
TIGER files for school districts. The data were collected from all 120 county-based school 
districts in Kentucky, as well as the 55 independent school districts. The dataset consisted 
of 10,250 observations from 1,279 schools over the eight year period. Middle schools and 
                                                 
3
 The data was originally collected by Dr. Eugenia Toma and her staff. It includes data from the Appalachian 
Math Science Partnership and Non-Appalachian Math Science Partnership school districts in Kentucky from 
2001-2008. 
13 
 
high schools were dropped from the data set because of the limited number of schools 
available in each district. Data from elementary schools were used in an attempt to achieve 
a more accurate measure of competition for the schools.   
Table 1: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description 
Attendance average daily student attendance 
Student:Teacher student to teacher ratio 
Enrollment total school enrollment 
Spending  spending per student in dollars 
Ethnicity White percent of white students in school 
Free/Reduced 
Lunch 
percent of students in school on 
free/reduced price lunch (poverty) 
Experience average years experience of all 
teachers in school 
Lagged Index 
Score 
lagged student academic index score 
Index Score student academic index score 
Schools Per 
Student 
number of schools per student 
District 
Enrollment 
log of total district enrollment 
Total Schools log of total schools in district 
Master's percent of teachers in school with a 
Master's degree 
Area land area of school district 
 
 
School achievement was measured as a function of the student academic index, 
standardized across time and school level. The Kentucky Department of Education defines 
the academic index as a number on a 0-140 scale that calculates how all students 
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performed on all of the seven Core Content subjects (reading, math, science, social studies, 
on-demand writing, arts & humanities, practical living/vocational studies, writing, and 
non-academic). An index of 100 is equivalent to average student performance, being 
measured as proficient, but may include some students at the distinguished level and some 
at the novice and apprentice levels. An index of 140 would mean students performed at the 
distinguished level in all subjects.  
The academic index provided the best single number for comparing the 
performance of different student groups and getting an overview of achievement gap issues 
(2003 CATS Interpretive Guide). A student academic index score variable was also 
generated with a one-year lag to attempt to capture prior impacts on student achievement. 
The lagged academic index score separates any influences on the index score from year to 
year, allowing for achievement to be accurately credited to the school or teacher for that 
year alone. 
In this paper, competition was measured in two ways: by the number of schools per 
student in the district as well as the district enrollment controlling for the total number of 
schools in a district. 
 
Research Model 
The aim for this paper was to determine the effects of school competition on student 
achievement by holding constant the effects from other variables. Possible random error 
was reduced by accounting for all the variables related to the schools, students, and 
teachers.  Variables used to represent school inputs in the model were student teacher 
ratio, spending per student, average years of teacher experience, and percent of teachers 
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with a Master’s degree. The variables used to represent the family and socioeconomic 
status were the percent average daily attendance, percent white students, and percent free 
and reduced lunch, which is used to measure the poverty level.  
As discussed previously, two measures of competition were used to determine the 
impact of competition on school performance, as measured by academic index scores. 
Because of the highly skewed nature of the data due to some outlying school districts, the 
district enrollment and total schools variables were converted to logarithms to show the 
logarithmic effect rather than the linear effect of the two variables. The logarithm of a 
number to a given base is the exponent to which the base must be raised to produce that number. 
Logarithmic scales reduce wide-ranging quantities to smaller scopes. In this case, a logarithm 
was utilized to diminished some of the variance in the district enrollment and total schools 
variables, providing a more normal distribution of the variables. 
Two methods of estimation were used to determine the effect of public school 
competition on school performance. A fixed-effects model was used to estimate the effects 
of changes in the explanatory variables, such as ratio of students to teachers or poverty 
level, on changes in the school academic index scores. A fixed-effects model controls for 
characteristics of the schools that are constant over time but that do vary considerably 
between schools and could impair the ability to isolate the effects of the variables of 
interest. By focusing on the changes over time for each school, the effect the changes have 
on school performance can be determined. By examining the characteristics within a school 
it was possible to determine whether a change within a school was associated with changes 
in school test scores over time.  
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A between-effects model was also used to estimate what how differences between 
schools affected school index scores. Comparing the differences in characteristics between 
schools identified what average school characteristics are associated with higher or lower 
school scores.  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Elementary Schools 
 
Measure na Mean StDevb Min Max 
Attendance 5766 82.62218 32.16563 0 98 
Student:Teacher 5799 15.45144 2.831889 6 122.9 
Enrollment 5800 406.1021 163.6612 69 1170 
Spending 5767 5217.99 2485.58 0 14775 
Ethnicity White 5462 74.76224 33.96492 0 100 
Free/Reduced 
Lunch 
5717 57.23551 22.05328 0 100 
Experience 5768 11.8146 2.669018 1.255814 26 
Lagged Index 
Score 
5700 76.84394 13.65018 33.4 125.4 
Index Score 5626 80.12947 13.81397 36.2 125.4 
Schools Per 
Student 
5800 0.0021529 0.0007977 0.001131 0.011583 
District 
Enrollment 
5800 15874.11 26702.65 139 90946 
Total Schools 5800 25.95966 39.32704 1 135 
Master's 5794 66.90099 28.7689 0 100 
Area 5792 291.5675 154.299 0.8126298 685.6155 
A  n refers to the number of observations. 
B  StDev refers to the standard deviation. 
 
 
For both estimation methods, the student academic index was regressed at the 
district level on demographic controls, teacher characteristics in the school, and the school 
competition measures of schools per student and the district enrollment controlling for the 
number of schools per district, leaving all other sources in Kentucky as the omitted base 
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category. Due to the panel form of the data, multiple observations of many variables over a 
period of time, a time trend regression was used.   
 
Research Question 1: Does an increase in school competition improve school performance?  
 
This first regression model used a fixed-effect estimator of competition4. The fixed-
effects model made it possible to control for all stable aspects of the individual school 
characteristics, even if they vary over time and cannot be measured. The fixed-effects 
estimation also allowed for general heteroscedasticity (robust estimation) and correlations 
within schools (clustering).  This model is represented by: 
Yit = A + β1X1 + β2X2 + ... + βnXn + αi + εit 
where Y signifies the academic index score of school i in year t, X represents the variables 
of interest, α denotes the unobserved individual school effect, and ε is the random error in 
the model.   
 
Research Question 2: Is there a relationship between school competition and school 
performance?  
 
 A secondary between-effects model was used to recover any hidden effects of the 
variables that may have been pulled into the effect of the environments of the individual 
schools. This estimation allowed for the isolation of effects of the variables that remained 
                                                 
4
 An indicator was used to represent all omitted variables 
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constant over time. The model used aggregated data to test effects between schools, 
assuming no school and time effect. The model is represented by: 
Yit = A + β1X1 + β2X2 + ... + βnXn + εit 
where Y again signifies the academic index score of school i in year t, X represents the 
variables of interest, and ε is the random error in the model.   
 
 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 The results of the empirical analysis were unexpected and in contradiction with the 
original hypothesis of competition in Kentucky. As previously mentioned, the hypothesis 
assumed that school competition would have a positive impact on school index scores. 
When measuring competition by number of schools per student in the district, the effect of 
competition was not significant (Table 3, Model 1). This was in opposition to the original 
theory that the availability of more schools to a student would increase the school 
performance. The second model of competition looked at district enrollment and total 
schools in the district as separate variables (Table 3, Model 2). In this model, yearly 
increases in district enrollment positively impacted school achievement, while the change 
in total number of schools was not significant.  
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Table 3: Fixed-effects Regression Output 
Elementary Schools 
 
 Estimated Coefficients (t-statistics) 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Attendance 0.06 (3.20)* 0.06 (3.19)* 
Student:Teacher -0.23 (-2.32)* -0.24 (-2.44)* 
Spending 0.00 (18.59)* 0.00 (18.33)* 
Ethnicity White -0.01 (-1.14 ) -0.01 (-0.96) 
Free/Reduced Lunch 0.06 (5.42)* 0.06 (5.16)* 
Experience -0.04 (-0.46) -0.01 (-0.11) 
Lagged Index Score 0.20 (18.41)* 0.19 (18.18)* 
Schools Per Student -1072 (-1.01) - - 
District Enrollment - - 8.51 (2.78)* 
Total Schools - - -3.93 (-1.39) 
Master's 0.07 (5.98)* 0.07 (5.97)* 
* significant at .05 confidence level 
** significant at .1 confidence level 
 
   
 
The positive effect of district enrollment on index scores could be attributed to the 
attraction of students to districts with higher test scores for a given year, or better teachers 
rather than a factor of competition itself. Attendance, spending per student, and teachers 
with a Master’s degree were all significant with a positive coefficient. These results were 
not surprising, indicating that schools with higher attendance, higher spending per student, 
and teachers with Master’s degrees had positive impacts on school performance. 
Interestingly, free & reduced lunch had a positive, albeit nominal, impact on school index 
scores. While this seems counter intuitive, a possible explanation may be that the schools in 
the most impoverished areas are typically the schools that have not been making adequate 
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yearly progress. These schools that were so far behind the state average only needed to 
make minimal changes to result in gains in scores, while the schools that were already 
doing fairly well had to work harder for smaller gains.  
When the two measures of competition were run with a between-effects estimator, 
schools per student was still not significant (Table 4, Model 1). The between-effects model 
provided another unexpected result, showing that on average for the eight years, higher 
district enrollment had a negative impact on academic index scores while the total number 
of schools was not significant (Table 4, Model 2). One reason for this result could be that 
there is a certain capacity level for schools and when that capacity level is exceeded, it has 
negative implications for school performance. Teachers with a Master’s degree, percentage 
of white students, and the total land area of the school district are significant and have a 
positive impact on school index scores. Free and reduced lunch, a measure of poverty, was 
significant and had a negative impact on school achievement. These results were expected 
given the normal assumptions of such variables on school performance as measured by the 
academic index score. If there is indeed a competitive effect among public schools in 
Kentucky, it is being overwhelmed by something else that the model was unable to capture.  
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Table 4: Between-effects Regression Output  
Elementary Schools 
 Estimated Coefficients (t-statistics) 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Attendance 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.05) 
Student:Teacher -0.06 (-0.44) 0.01 (0.08) 
Spending -0.00 (-0.91) -0.00 (-0.13) 
Ethnicity White 0.10 (4.84)* 0.08 (3.36)* 
Free/Reduced Lunch -0.20 (-11.91)* -0.21 (-11.89)* 
Experience 0.09 (0.74) 0.07 (0.54) 
Lagged Index Score 0.48 (13.74)* 0.48 (13.66)* 
Schools Per Student 6.11 (1.55) - - 
District Enrollment - - -2.37 (-2.10)* 
Total Schools - - 1.96 (1.55) 
Master's 0.18 (4.67)* 0.19 (4.79)* 
Area 0.00 (3.52)* 0.00 (3.74)* 
* significant at .05 confidence level 
** significant at .1 confidence level 
   
 
DISCUSSION 
Recommendations 
A basic yet serious question for policy makers is whether public choice actually 
matters in Kentucky. Significant research has been done on private and charter school 
competition, with results suggesting that the competition from these options does have an 
impact on public schools. However, given the results of this research, it appears that public 
schools in Kentucky do not serve as competition to each other in regards to improving 
school performance.   
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The findings, showing little correlation between competition among public schools 
and improvement on academic index scores, have important policy implications. This study 
concluded that yearly increases in district enrollment had positive effects on school 
performance, but on average over the eight years examined, increased district enrollment 
had negative effects. Focusing greater attention on schools which saw an increase from 
year to year could improve the understanding of what attracts students to certain schools.  
 
Limitations 
There were several limitations to the model in this paper, partially due to the nature 
of the dataset. These data use provided information solely on public schools in Kentucky. 
Given the difficulty of accurately measuring public school competition in Kentucky, a more 
appropriate comparison might have been competition as measured against private schools.  
In this paper, school performance was measured by standardized test results. While 
this is a common variable often used to measure school performance, it is possible that 
public schools are competing with one another but that the competition is not influencing 
school performance.  
As previous literature has shown, students who opt out of their assigned school or 
school district may be self-selecting into new schools because of some type of perceived 
advantages. This transfer might increase the performance of the new school and decrease 
the performance of the old school without the student’s performance actually changing. A 
more direct measure could be whether students who transfer have better outcomes than 
they would have if they had not transferred. Unfortunately, since the data set was collected 
23 
 
at a school level, it did not track students who switched into or out of their designated 
school.  
Previously in the paper, it was mentioned that the assumption was made that 
students only attend public schools in their county of residence because the exact location 
of the school was known but not the location of the residence of the student. This study 
could have been improved if student level data were available and included the location of 
the student’s residence, it might better determine a student’s school choice set and in turn 
provide more relevant information regarding the competition in their catchment area.  
For this paper, district enrollment and total schools were converted to logarithms to 
provide a more normal distribution of the variables. This in essence discarded Jefferson 
and Fayette County from the model as outliers due to their high number of elementary 
schools relative to other counties. While this was necessary to provide an accurate measure 
of competition, it might not accurately portray the public school options of students living 
in the counties surrounding Jefferson and Fayette.  
Finally, it may simply be that there was not enough variance in rural Kentucky 
school districts to see any effects of competition. The attributes of public schools in 
Kentucky do not dramatically vary from each other, and therefore any effects of 
competition on school performance are difficult to measure.  
 
Future Research 
Given the somewhat unexpected results of this study, it seems that a better 
understanding of the impact of competition could be gleaned from continued research in 
Kentucky, both in rural and urban school districts.  The primary question of this study was 
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whether increased competition has an impact on school academic index scores. Based on 
the results, a definitive statement on public competition cannot be made through this 
research. However, the results presented here suggest that future evidence on how 
competition impacts public schools in Kentucky will have to acknowledge the impact of 
private schools and the attributes of neighboring public schools.  
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